Abstract:
According to the established criterion of brain-death, death has occurred when
the brain has ceased functioning irreversibly, even though the human organism as
a whole might still continue to function. Why is this so? This book aims to show
that this criterion of death cannot be justified except where it is related to a
mentalistic definition of life. A mentalistic definition of the end and the
beginning of a life finds strong support via the mentalistic theory of
self-identity which is the most generally accepted answer to the question of
what we essentially are.
Introduction
Brain-related
death criteria require ontological revision. This is so since according to
brain-related death-criteria not every functioning organism is per se a living
being. Brain-related death criteria make sense only if they go together with a
mentalistic definition of the end and the beginning of a life.
A mentalistic life-definition is superior to an organismic life-definition. This
is so because a functioning organism is not necessarily equal to be a living
being. We are living beings. The best answer to the question of what we
essentially are seems to be the embodied-mind account of existence. We are
essentially psycho-physical unities. Which is to say that a life lasts as long
as such a unity exists. At least for those beings who have a brain,
brain-related death-criteria seem to be the best death-criteria available.
Brain-related death-criteria require a mentalistic definition of death. A
mentalistic definition of death requires brain-related death criteria.
Chapter
1
Definitions and
criteria
Definitions are
two-dimensional. The dimension of intension determines which qualities an entity
must have in order to belong to the extension of a concept. The extension of a
concept is given by all those entities that fulfil that which is required by the
intension of the relevant concept.
Chapter
2
One definition
might go along with different criteria
Chapter
3
The symmetry of the
end and the beginning of a life
The end of a life
and the beginning of a life require one and the same definition.
Chapter
4
Critique of the
expression “brain-death”
It is not brains
that die, but living beings.
Chapter
5
Critique
of the concept of “living organs”, “living tissue”, “living matter”
Not only brains do
not die, neither do tissues, body parts or body cells and matter.
Chapter
6
Life
in spite of “braindeath”?
Chapter
7
Organismic
integration in organisms whose brains have irreversibly ceased to function
Chapter
8
“Brain-life”
In the same manner
that organs such as brains do not die, they do not live. However, if we accept a
brain-related criterion for the end of a human life, we should also accept a
brain-related criterion for the beginning of a human life.
Chapter
9
Anencepalics
If (and only if)
we assume that the brain-parts of an anencephalic do not realise consciousness,
there is a functioning human organism but not a living human being. However, the
brain-parts of many anencephalics seem to realise at least a weak form of
consciousness – even though there is no fore brain.
Chapter
10
Persistent
Vegetative State
Chapter
11
Twice
dead?
After I have died
because my brain has irreversibly ceased to realise consciousness, there is no
one there to survive me. Even though my organism might still be a functioning
organism, it cannot be alive. Those who are of the opinion that my functioning
organism is alive after I have passed away apply two definitions of the end of a
life at the same time. Due to the vagueness of its intension, the extension of
the expression “living being” is rendered as vague. This contravenes the
idea of a definition.
Chapter
12
Organisms
and living beings
At the level of
conceptualisation I suggest that we differ between mindless organisms and living
beings.
Chapter
13
Plants
and brain-related death-criteria
If plants have no
mental qualities they are not living beings.
a. Aristotle
b. Crusius
c. Kant
d. Hegel
e. Jonas
Chapter
14
Subpersonal
consciousness
I continue to
exist even if I cease to be a person. When I started to exist I was not a person
but a living being with subpersonal consciousness. I will continue to exist as
long as my brain realises consciousness however weak or simple it may be.
Chapter
15
Psycho-physical
unities
Psycho-physical
unity is the most basic expression that qualifies what a living being is. There
could be living beings that are not conscious organisms. However, as long as we
assume that there are no disembodied minds, every living being will be a
psycho-physical unity. A unity that ceases to exist when the physis ceases to
support consciousness.
Chapter
16
Intermittent
non-existence
If it is so that
my brain does not realise consciousness intermittently (perhaps when I am in a
deep sleep), then I do not exist for those stretches of time. Intermittent
non-existence does not equal death. As soon as my brain starts to realise
consciousness again, I will continue to exist. Death is eternal non-existence.
Chapter
17
Does the concept of an “embryonic potential”
challenge the symmetry of the end and the beginning of a life?
Some philosophers
admit that the irreversible end of a functioning brain indicates the end of a
life. According to them, however, a life begins before a brain starts to support
consciousness. They say so because they take into consideration a so called
embryonic potential. While the “brain-dead” adult is said to be dead because
he has no such potential, the embryo that has no brain as yet is said to be
alive because of an alleged potential. This chapter is dedicated to
demonstrating that the embryonic potential is an ontological fallacy.
Chapter
18
The
destruction of organisms and the killing of living beings
Once we differ
between mere organisms and living beings, we have to envisage that it does not
make sense to talk about the killing of mere organisms. Only living beings are
entities that can be killed.
Chapter
19
Corpses,
piety and morals
Chapter
20
Intermediary considerations: The question for the
end and the beginning of our existence and the question of self-identity
Chapter
21
Do brain-related death-criteria and the mentalistic
definition of death contravene basic intuitions?
Brain-related
death-criteria contradict basic intuitions because according to them not every
functioning human organisms represents a living human being. Brain-related
death-criteria serve our intuitions because according to them life and soul (consciousness)
are interrelated.
Chapter
22
The
thought experiment of non-organismic conscious entities
Chapter
23
Dicephalus
The rare
phenomenon of two people who share one organism seems to prove that none of us
essentially is his or her organism.
Chapter
24
Body
transplantation
In a thought
experiment I can change my body and remain the same person. This seems to prove
that I am the – stream of – consciousness that is realised by my brain
rather than my functioning organism.
Chapter
25
Subjects of life and subjects of death. The
organism as “something”. The living being as “someone”.
Chapter
26
Consciousness
– a minimal consensus
Chapter
27
The
realisation of consciousness as an ontic hiatus and signum for living beings
Chapter 28
Brain-related
criteria of death do not imply a reification of the concept of “living being”
While molecular
biology conveys the conviction that there is nothing special about life, the
mentalistic definition of death confirms the idea that living beings cannot be
reduced to chemistry.
Chapter 29
Outlook
There is
uncertainty as to which parts of a brain are necessary for there to be at least
weak consciousness. For this reason we should not give up whole-brain death
criteria.